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This paper draws upon an arena study on the accounting and accountability processes used within 
a business sector, under intense public and regulatory scrutiny in terms of its social, economic 
and ecological risks. Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2004, 2005) report on an absence of 
environmental accounting within the salmon farming organizations for management planning and 
control processes. This paper extends this analysis by attempting to theorise the social and 
environmental accounting observed by these organizations discharging these accountability 
duties using insights from the risk society literature. 
 
The interviews and documentary analysis revealed the existence of an active accountability 
network. However, Social and Environmental Accounting techniques did not feature in the 
engagement processes. We observed the existence of fragmented accountability networks, and 
evidence of a struggle for domination of a techno-scientific accountability process. Within these 
discourses, business and cost issues were evident, but they were not formally quantified or 
systematically integrated. We find that the accountability processes observed in our arena study, 
were consistent with Beck’s (and others) analysis of reflexive modernity and the Risk Society 
Thesis  
 
This paper by evaluating accounting and accountability processes within a specific context, 
demonstrates the importance of locating social and environmental accounting processes within 
wider accountability discourses. These societal accountability discourses extend beyond social 
and environmental as well as conventional accounting practices. It is suggested that all 
accounting practices should become more reflexive in nature if they are to remain relevant in 
these wider societal accountability discourses. 




This paper reports on an arena study into social, environmental accounting and accountability 
practices associated with Scottish Salmon Farming. We attempt to map out the governance 
structures (both political and sub -political), the accountability mechanisms, the perceived risks of 
salmon farming and those risks that are regarded as ‘real’ or ‘legitimate’ by the different actors in 
this arena. Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2004, 2005) report an absence of social and 
environmental accounting within the salmon farming sector, however this absence, we will argue, 
does not necessarily imply an absence of social, environmental and economic accountability.  
 
Our empirical findings tend to support the emerging Risk Society thesis, initially developed by 
Beck (1992a). In this paper we present a model to help understand in a more systemic fashion the 
variety and diversity of accountability mechanisms found in practice. The model locates 
accountability processes within an interdependent, co-evolving set of relationships between risk 
perceptions (see for example Lupton, 1999, The Royal Society 1992, National Research Council 
1989), risk legitimisation mechanisms (see for example Anshen, 1980; Held, 1996, Gray et al, 
1996, Lindblom, 1994), governance structures and institutions (see for example Foucault 1984, 
1988, 1991, Ewald 1991, Gordon 1991, Kendall and Wickham 1992, Castel 1991) . 
Underpinning this model is the importance of reflexivity (see for example Beck 1992a, b, 1994a, 
b, 1995, 1996, Beck et al, 1994, and Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994a, b, 2002) between the different 
elements. Without reflexivity, in which accountability mechanisms are critical, the hazards 
associated with industrial modernity to our eco-system, society and eventually economic well-
being will be legitimated and allowed to proliferate. Our analysis of this specific sector indicates 
a lack of reflexivity with fragmented political and non-political ‘single- issue’ governance 
structures, fragmented ‘single- issue’ accountability processes, polarised positions on the 
‘legitimate’ risks of salmon farming, lack of accountability between difference governance 
institutions and a contested discourse between different coalitions of actors. The governance 
assemblage at the time of this study suggests that the political governance structures are being 
used to legitimate current practices from the ‘irrational’ criticisms of different protest groups. 
Sub-political protest groups in an attempt to ‘rationalise’ their campaigns are currently adopting 
the techno-scientific legitimisation mechanisms of the political institutions.  
 
What we observe is not the absence of accountability, but rather a rich, diverse and 
comprehensive set of social, environmental and economic accounts. Whilst not all perceived risks 
are accounted for, the current information set has considerable potential for an emergent, holistic 
accounting of the social and environmental costs (and benefits) of salmon farming. The salmon 
farmers are providing numerous accounts of their actions, however these accounts are sent to 
largely unaccountable political institutions. These institutions, in theory anyway, are accountable 
in that they are governed by representative democratic bodies, yet in practise fall far short of 
providing full and transparent accounts of their actions.  
 
Each institution (political and sub-political) has its own privileged definition of ‘legitimate’ risks. 
Their ‘legitimate’ risk perception is linked with their specific accountability demands of the 
salmon farmers. These restricted accounts reinforce their legitimated risk perceptions, rather than 
reflexively critique them. The absence of a holistic, sustainable, stakeholder, who is possibly a 
mythical creation, and the unreflexive relationship between governing institutions means that 
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salmon farming accountability processes are extremely problematic in governing the risks 
associated with this industry.  
 
Crudely, the different institutions can be characterised as ‘single-issue’ demanding partial and 
specific ‘accounts’ of the salmon farmers practices whilst prescribing specific ‘solutions’ to 
minimise or eliminate specific ‘risks’. No meta-governance process (reflexivity) exists that could 
integrate or synthesise these specific ‘accounts’, ‘solutions’ or ‘risks’. 
 
The lack of any significant  ‘meta-accountability’ processes allo ws the political governance 
institutions, in coalition with some sub-political governance institutions and elements of the 
media to operate as legitimating structures protecting those they are charged with governing, 
rather than reducing the farmers’ potential harm to the eco-system and societal groupings. 
 
This paper will consist of four sections. The next section will briefly describe the research 
methods used to gather and interpret the empirical evidence. This will be followed by an 
overview of the literature used in this paper and the presentation of the model that will be used to 
describe and evaluate the evidence gathered. The next section will then present our findings in 
terms of the risk perceptions associated with salmon farming, the political and sub-political 
governance institutions, the accountability practices observed and map out the alignments and 
relationships observed in this study. This last section will evaluate implications of these findings, 




The underlying structure of this project is that of an arena study (Renn 1992). An arena approach 
was chosen as it provides a frame to capture the key accountability relationships and present data 
gathered from a variety of different sources. The arena approach was an appropriate research 
device given our definition of risk. Our conceptualization of risk incorporates a variety of ways 
of understanding and managing risk1, in particularly the recognition of risk as a real and cognitive 
phenomenon  emerging from a complex set of social and institutional discourses. The arena 
model does not attempt to integrate these different discourses, but rather allows their 
representation, by focusing on the debates over risk issues and the behavior of different actors. 
Integrating these perspectives is a necessary and difficult part of this project but we feel it would 
be less useful to mix them together without first specifying each concept and creating a common 
network of linkages between them. 
 
The concept of arena policies is not an integrative framework that combines scientific, 
individual, social and institutional responses to risks. It is a theoretical framework based on the 
political concept of arena policies and the basic structure of the resource mobilisation theory. Its 
strength is its focus on political debates about risk issues and the behaviour of each actor in such 
debates. 
 
The concept underpinning an arena approach is that social groups in a political arena try to 
maximise their opportunity to influence the outcome of the collective decision process by 
                                                
1 (See for example Lash 1993, 1994a, b, 2000, Lash & Wynne 1992, Wynne 1989, 1992, 1996, Slovic 1992, Slovic 
et al 1980, Tversky and Kahneman 1973, Kahneman and Tversky 1971, 1972, 1979) 
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mobilising social resources. The outcome however, is determined not only by individual or 
group actions but also by the structural arena rules and the interaction effects among the 
competing groups. This theory is based on the assumption that individuals and organisations can 
influence the policy process only if they have sufficient resources available to pursue their goals. 
The political organisation of an arena and the external effects of each group’s actions on another 
group’s actions constitute structural constraints that make the outcome of an arena struggle often 
incompatible with the evidence and /or values of any participating group. 
 
An arena is a metaphor to describe the symbolic location2 of political actions that influence 
collective decisions or policies. The arena model incorporates only those actions of individual or 
social groups that are intended to influence collective decisions or policies. Intentional behaviour 
of individuals are conceptualised as inputs into the arena rather than as elements of the model. 
 
Within a policy field several arenas may exist in which actors have to be present in order to 
influence the policy process. These arenas may be closely related and share actors. For this 
reason they are referred as stages within a single arena. That social groups in an arena intend to 
influence policies is the only assumption in terms of making inferences about intentions, 
motivations, goals, purposes, or hidden, or overt motives of social actors. Under this assumption 
success and failure of group activities can be measured by the amount of influence that the 
specific group has been able to exert on the resulting decision(s) or policies. (Renn 1992). 
 
The central stage of the arena (see figure 1) is occupied by the groups in society that seek to 
influence policy. Some groups focus on several issues at once and are involved in multiple 
arenas, whilst others focus only on one issue in a single arena. Each arena is characterised by a 
set of rules: formal rules that are coded and monitored by a rule enforcement agency; and 
informal rules that are learned and developed in the process of interactions among the actors. In 
most cases the rules are external constraints for each single actor and several actors may join 
forces to change the rules3 even if they disagree on the substance of the issue.  
 
 
The rule enforcement agency ensures that the actors abide by the formal rules and often 
coordinates the process of interaction and negotiation. In many arenas the rule enforcement 
agency is also the ultimate decision maker. In this case all actors try to make their claims known 
to the decision makers and to convince them by arguments or through public pressure to adopt 
their viewpoint. 
 
Figure 1 – General Arena Model 
 
 
                                                
2 Symbolic location means that arenas are neither geographic entities nor organisational systems. They describe the 
political actions of all social actors involved in a specific issue. The arena concept attempts to explain the process of 
policy formulation and enforcement in a specific policy field. Its focus is on the meso-level of society rather than on 
the individual (micro-level) or on societal behaviour as a whole (macro-level). It reflects the segmentation of society 
into different policy systems that interact with each other but still preserve their autonomy (Renn, 1992, pp 181). 
3 Formal rules require institutional actions to change whereas informal changes occur as a result of trial and error 
and may change according to whether or not rule bending is penalised (Renn, 1992,  pp 182). 





























































Issue amplifiers are the professional “theatre critics” who observe the actions on stage, 
communicate with the principal actors, interpret their findings, and report them to the audience.  
Through this communication process they influence the allocation of resources and the 
effectiveness of each resource to mobilise public support within the arena. The audience consists 
of other social groups who may be enticed to enter the arena and individuals who process the 
information and may feel motivated to show their support or displeasure with one or several 
actors or the arena as a whole. Part of the political process is to mobilise social support by other 
social actors and to influence public opinion. 
 
The arena concept does not picture the actions as actors performing role assignments as the 
theatre stage metaphor does (Palmlund, 1992). Arenas provide actors with the opportunity to 
direct their claims to the decision ma kers and thus to influence the policy process. Actors may 
use innovative approaches to policy-making or use traditional channels of lobbying. Arenas are 
regulated by norms and rules, which limit the range of potential options. Actors may decide to 
ignore some of the rules if they feel that public support will not suffer and if the rule enforcement 
agency is not powerful enough to impose penalties on actors who violate the rules. 
 
The outcome of the arena process is undetermined. Various actors may play out different 
strategies that interact with each other and produce synergistic effects. Strategic maneuvering 
may even result in an undesired outcome that does not reflect the stated goal of any actor and 
may be sub-optimal for all participants. On the other hand, interactions in the arena may change 
the arena rules. Novel forms of political actions may evolve as actors experience the boundaries 
of tolerance for limited rule violations. Those arena characteristics limit its use for predictions 
but do not compromise its value for explanation and policy analysis (Renn, 1992, pp 182 – 184). 
 
In modern democratic societies actors need more than one resource to be successful in an arena. 
All actors, including the rule enforcement agency need a minimal reservoir of social resources in 
order to be successful in a given arena. These social resources include money, power, social 
influence, value commitment and evidence. These social resources can be used to gain the 
attention and support of the general public, to influence the arena rules, and to score in 
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competition with the other actors. Resources help actors to be more influential. Resources may 
be the ultimate goals of an actor, but more likely they are the means by which actors can 
accomplish their specific intentions.  
 
This empirical dimension of this project was based on an arena model (Renn 1992). An arena 
approach was chosen as it provides a frame to capture the key accountability relationships and 
present data gathered from a variety of different sources from a complex set of social and 
institutional discourses. The arena model does not attempt to integrate these different discourses, 
but rather allows their representation, by focusing on the debates over key issues and the 
behavior of different actors. The concept of arena policies is not an integrative framework that 
combines scientific, individual, social and institutional responses. The theoretical framework of 
an arena is based around the notion of political policy debates and resource mobilisation theory. 
 
Empirical data was gathered on each of the key elements of the arena model. The nature of each 
elements meant that different research methods were used to gather information to provide as rich 
as possible description of salmon farming. Where primary data was collected the strategy was to 
capture information on each actor’s position and on their perception and opinions on the other 
actors. This allowed us to gather information and triangulate their ‘self-description’ and others 
external view of these actors. The preferred mode of data gathering was by semi-structured 
interviews with farmers, stakeholders, political institutions, stakeholder groups and rule-
enforcers. Within these groups we sought to get a range of different opinions. For example, we 
included a number of salmon farmers who were involved (and had pioneered the development of) 
in organic salmon production methods. When selecting stakeholder groups we included groups 
who were known to oppose salmon farming as well as groups who were in favour or act ively 
promoted salmon farming. Similarly with rule enforcers, we interviewed statutory rule enforcers, 
such as statutory environmental protection agencies as well as voluntary product certification 
bodies.  
 
Where it was not possible to arrange interviews, due to access, confidentiality issues and 
unavailability of people to interview this was augmented by a postal survey of salmon farmers4, 
documentary evaluation of policy documents, government statistics, official government reports 
and reports by stakeho lder groups or related institutions. These documents were analysed using 
the same coding structure as used in analysing the interview data, using O’Dwyer’s (2004) 
framework of interview data analysis. In addition, data was gathered on the media representation 
of salmon farming of the main Scottish newspapers and a survey of salmon prices. We did not 
undertake any analysis of the perspective of the general public, which is a limitation of this study. 
One rationale for this was that as the study unfolded, the  general public was largely absent from 
the debate, with many of the institutions claiming to represent the ‘general public’. 
Unsurprisingly the ‘general public’ when referred to in interviews or reports were used to 
legitimate the position of the different institutions.  
 
Figure 4 represents the participants in this project, in terms of their role in the arena model and 
the mode of gathering information.  Two main methods were used to select the research 
participants. The first was a postal survey, which as well as capturing baseline data about the 
sector, included a request for volunteers to participate in interviews. The second method was a 
                                                
4 120 questionnaires were sent out, however the response rate was quite low (13.3%), despite several follow ups. 
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networking approach where in the interviews with these original volunteers, we requested 
information on who else to talk to. Pilot interviews were held with four fish farms and the 
Scottish Salmon Growers Association (SSGA). From these pilot interviews, leads were identified 
of other possible companies to would participate in the project. Several follow ups were made to  
secure those interviews, resulting in 10 companies (including SSGA) participating in the 
interview stage. Therefore, it is important to note that these companies were self- selecting and 
biased towards a specific geographic region and therefore not wholly representative of the whole 
sector. In a similar fashion key stakeholder organisations were identified from the interviews with 
the salmon farmers. These organisations were contacted and interviews were arranged. For a 
comprehensive list of the organisations involved in this study see appendix 1.   
     
All the interviews were taken at the work place and for all of the salmon farming companies, site 
visits also took place. All the interviews, with the exception of two5, were recorded and lasted 
between forty five minutes to one and a half hours. Additional material was also gathered in the 
form of photographs. Summary notes were written up as soon as feasible after the end of each 
interview. The interviewees were friendly and supportive, even in the cases when the interviews 
were not pre-arranged. Given the geographical remoteness of the salmon farms and time taken to 
get there in a number of cases the researchers simply turned up, provided a brief summary of the 
research and asked if anyone would be available for interview.  
   
Interview and documentary analysis  
 
In analyzing the empirical evidence we adapted O’ Dwyer (2004) practical, non-prescriptive 
process of analysis to transform data sets emanating from interviews and documents into a well – 
founded, coherent and illuminating narrative. Briefly our data analysis involved three linked sub-
processes of data reduction, data display, and data interpretation (Huberman et al, 1994, pp 429). 
These processes occurred before data collection, during study design and planning; during data 
collection as interim and early analyses were carried out; and after data collection during the final 
project write-up.   
 
Interviews were converted into transcripts and initially coded based on our initial research 
questions and three different conceptual lenses: a) what is the risk construction of each of the 
interviewed parties. What is risk for the salmon farmers, what it means for the rest of the 
involved parties – stakeholders, what it means/meant for the organic producers; b) how decisions 
are made in the salmon farming industry and how risk communication affects/has affected that 
decision making process of the specific fish farmers to move into organic salmon production6; 
and c) what is the communication route/relationship between the industry and the rest of the 
stakeholders and what are the messages conveyed forth and back. 
                                                
5 There were only two exceptions. In the department of law of the Regional  Council, one interviewee refused  to be 
recorded and notes had to be taken. A number of questions were avoided as unwanted disclosure information and 
the interview only lasted for 15 minutes. Later it was found that the salmon producers did not enjoy good 
relationships with the department. The second case involved SEERAD’s Analytical Services Division. The interview 
there was rather opportunistic and took place while waiting for an interview from the Fisheries Group. The 
interviewee was responsible for the Scottish Sea farming industry and provided valuable information on the policies 
of SEERAD regarding aquaculture. The Interview was not recorded and was more of an informal friendly discussion. 
It lasted for about twenty minutes and notes were taken.    
6 As addressed in Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2004, 2005). 
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The text analysis was made through a code- and- retrieve process (Richards and Richards, 1994).  
In the first level of analysis variables were identified for each of the respective themes and the 
interview transcripts were initially coded according to their dominant meaning. These coded 
extracts were input into data tables and re-grouped according to these initial codes. This allowed 
the researcher to store and retrieve key statements of each interview and relevant quotes from 
documents.    
 
The next step involved the collapsing of the previously identified and grouped variables for the 
categories of a) risk construction; and b) communication route/relat ionship process, and messages 
conveyed, into more general themes. This set of thematic codes was used as framework for 
analysis of the relevant documents, including: the Strategic Framework for Scottish Aquaculture 
(Scottish Executive 2003); the one that got away: marine salmon farming in Scotland (Friends of 
the Earth Scotland, 2001); and SNH’s vision of sustainable marine aquaculture in Scotland (SNH 
2002). These reports were therefore reviewed via the same conceptual lens and codes as the 
interviews.   
 
The third level of analysis, involved the preparation of cognitive maps (Kitchin and Freundschub, 
2000), presenting the risks issues and communication patterns allowing a systemic or arena 
model of the salmon sector. It is this level of analysis which we report upon in this paper. These 
cognitive maps allowed a systemic representation of the risk construction, risk communication, 
and relationships between the actors to be constructed. This perspective allows us to examine and 
evaluate the different accountability mechanisms operating within this arena. Of particular 
interest was the possibility of diversity in legitimate risks of different actors, communication 
routes, communication methods, and communication messages.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW.  
 
The theoretical model used in this paper draws upon the emerging research literature on risk. 
Risk has been subject to a sustained and interdisciplinary investigation as to its underlying nature 
(see for example The Royal Society 1992), defining and measuring risk (Krimsk y 1992, Slovic 
1992, Slovic et al 1980) appropriate modes of governance (Foucault 1984, 1988, 1991, Ewald 
1991, Gordon 1991, Kendall and Wickham 1992, Castel 1991, Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994a, b, 
2002) impact of institutional structures (Beck 1992a, b, 1994a, b, 1995, 1996, Beck et al, 1994) 
and its sociological, psychological and cultural significance (Lash 1993, 1994a, b, 2000, Lash & 
Wynne 1992, Wynne 1989, 1992, 1996, Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Thompson 1980, 
Thompson and Wildavsky 1982, Thompson et al 1990, Wildavsky 1994, Wildavsky and Dake 
1990). It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive review of this risk 
literature. In the context of this paper, the key aspects of this literature relate to the social 
construction of risk perceptions (Adam and Van Loon 2000, Adams 1995), risk legitimization 
processes (Beck 1992a), risk governance institutions and practices, risk communication 
mechanisms (Royal Society 1992, Renn 1992, Palmlund 1992, Kasperson 1992, Kasperson et al, 
1988, Kates and Kasperson, 1983), political and sub-political risk governance processes.  
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Drawing upon the risk society thesis (as developed by Beck 1992a, b, 1994a, b, 1995, 1996, Beck 
et al 1994) risks can be seen to be both real and epistemological, emerging from interactions 
between political and sub-political discourses. The same ‘things’ are regarded as legitimate and 
irrational by different groups and individuals in society. The risk society is characterized by 
disputes over the true nature of risks and hazards and appropriate methods of their governance. 
Broadly speaking in the risk society, political institutions (governments, local authorities, civil 
service, public sector organizations and agencies) have been captured by scientism, whereby risks 
have to be proved to be true by modern scientific methodologies. Unless risks can be confirmed 
by scientific investigations, they, de facto, do not exist. If they do not exist, then no action need 
be taken to reduce, eliminate or govern them.  
 
It is only if a risk is classified as legitimate that regulations are established or amended, political 
institutions set up and tasked with managing the risk. Managing these risks involves, the isolation 
of facts, normalization and surveillance. This process tends to reify certain risks, granting those 
risks power in discourses and empowering those that govern them (Habermas 1985 in Beck 
1992a page 189). 
 
Risk society theorists regard contemporary western society as an industrial modernity, a state 
which has been subject to a major redistribution of political power. The traditional model of 
modernity, with its strong political centre regulating the non-political domains of economics, 
science and technology and citizens private lives has broken down. The political centre has 
become de-politicised, due to the epistemological dominance of techno-scientific rationality. 
Political decisions now require to be legitimated and justified by ‘high quality’ scientific 
evidence. Political decisions are pre-fabricated by expert influence groups who provide their own 
scientific evidence (Beck 1992a, p188).  However, industrial scientism is flawed in its ability to 
prove risks, hazards and harm actually exist. This inability allows these risks, hazards and harm 
not only to continue but actually to legitimate the status quo and its development trajectory 
further promulgating future risk, hazards and harm. 
 
Political risk governance is therefore restricted to a small subset of risks that are capable of 
reliable scientific measurement with proven causal connections to harm, which, in turn, are 
restricted to harm that only exist if they too can be measured according to scientific principles. 
The impact of these risks, in terms of their actual impact on human and ecological systems, is not 
the determining factor of political risk governance. For example, the current debate over the 
rebirth of nuclear power station building program in the UK is justified by the measurable 
benefits in the reduction of CO2 emissions allegedly reducing global warming and the as yet 
‘unproven’ catastrophic hazards of nuclear power production are downplayed. In the risk society 
risks are causally denied by the application of inappropriate scientific rationality. 
 
Another consequence of basing political risk governance on scientific methods is that those 
legitimated risks are governed in a fragmented and incoherent fashion, analogous to the 
fragmented specialization trajectory of modern science. Beck sums this process as providing a 
blank cheque to economic and technological developments to poison and damage our 
environment and society (Beck 1992a, p65). 
 
However, the risk society is also characterized by the politicization of the previously non-
political, what is referred to as sub-political movements. Sub -politics is the application of the 
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basic principles of modernity that empower the citizen to participate in societal governance, 
freedom of thought and expression, a free press and an independent judiciary. As the impact of 
class inequity and industrial and agricultural pollution become more visible to citizens7, 
combined with the political denial of their existence, trust and respect for the political centre 
breaks down. In this space, groups of citizens emerged challenging the supremacy and legitimacy 
of the existing political governance structures, creating what Habermas (1985, in Beck 1992a 
p.190) describes as the new obscurity. 
 
Within this new obscurity, there is a weakening of social structures, unpredictability in voter 
behaviour, the mobilization of citizens, single issue protests and wider social movements 
attempting to affect change. Industrial modernity creates the conditions that permit its own 
demystification, in particular the growing recognition that representative democracy operates as a 
democratic dictatorship. This growing recognition has led to a challenging of the powers of 
previously trusted political institutions by citizens simply exercising their civil rights. The 
political centre (which has been largely de-politicised) has lost power to these civil groups, 
particularly on issues of politically and scientifically denied risks, that these citizens have been 
subjected too and have experienced real harm from. These sub-political movements, which tend 
to be single- issue (as fragmented as political risk governance institutions), gained success in 
legitimating, previously dismissed, risks and getting them subject to regulation, or banned 
altogether. This visible success led to a snowballing of sub-political movements. Perhaps the 
most visible sub-political campaign to date was the legitimating of the risks of global climate 
change and the establishment of global mechanisms to govern and reduce these risks. In 
accordance with the risk society thesis, various countries are refusing to comply with the Kyoto 
protocol, based on a denial of the legitimacy of the science underpinning the global climate 
change hypothesis. 
 
The subpolitical movement has had and continues to play a critical role in societal governance, 
but it has certain characteristics that are worthy of note. The rise of the number and power of 
these protest groups is not matched by their democratic accountability. Sub-political institutions 
tend to be structured on the private corporate model with their restricted duties of accountability. 
Sub-political groups are extremely heterogeneous, motivated by diverse aims and value sets. Sub-
political does not mean political subversion against those in power. Sub-politics is the expression 
of basic human rights of the citizen for freedom of thought, expression and speech. Sub-politics 
does not imply a coherent or shared ideology. It is wrong to think of sub -political movements as 
automatically opposed to economic-technological developments, the exploitation of natural 
and/or human resources. It is the case that many of the most visible sub-political groups have 
been opposed to the notion that techno-scientific developments necessarily equate to social 
benefit, and have made considerable impacts in obstructing and inhibiting this development 
trajectory, but not all. 
 
There are a number of sub-political groups that act in the interests of economic growth, 
technological development and scientifically determined progress, and these groups use the same 
mechanisms (freedom of the press and the judicial system) to further their chosen aims and 
objectives. Many of these groups have also been highly successful in lobbying political 
institutions, working in collaboration of these institutions providing evidence and support for 
                                                
7 Beck (1992a, p 53)  refers to this as the ‘the spell of the invisibility of risk can be broken by personal experiences’. 
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oppressive and societally damaging activities or creating scientific ambiguity to oppose or 
neutralize other sub-political groups.  
 
In general the sub-political movement has created a number of important changes to governance 
in industrial modernity. It has largely debunked the notion of the ‘best and only solution’ to 
problems in the increasing complexity of late modernity. They have challenged the ‘wise and 
trusted’ image of political institutions and created the notion that solutions should be a process of 
collective actions that observe citizens democratic rights. Sub-political movements have created 
systems of extra-parliamentary monitoring and surveillance of potentially everything and 
everyone. Sub-politics creates sub-accountability processes to challenge the dominance of the 
political and corporate accounts. It is argued that these sub-accounting processes create the 
possibility of a reflexive governance structure by enabling a creative and productive dialogic 
engagement between the political and sub -political movements. Reflexivity, it is argued, is the 
process that should bring about a rebalancing of power along the basic principles of modernity. 
 
Figure 2 – Overview of Emergent Risk Process 
 
 

























Risks can therefore be seen as locally and temporally emergent from these dialo gic engagements 
(see Figure 2). At any point in time there will be differences in what are ‘real’ risks, methods of 
dealing with these risks and methods of adequately accounting for and communicating these risks 
to others. Risks at any point in time will shaped by reflexively related factors such as political 
risk legitimisation processes, political governance institution and processes, political 
accountability mechanisms, sub-political risk legitimisation processes, sub-political governance 
institutions and processes, and sub-political accountability mechanisms. According the reflexive 
modernists (and some reflexive post modernists) the effective governance of risks depends on the 
inter-relationships between these different elements and the ability to transcend these fragmented 
legitimate risks and to synthesise new transdisciplinary legitimate risks. These transdisciplinary 
risks will then form the basis for constructing appropriate governance structures and 
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accountability mechanisms. Accountability mechanisms are crucial in maintaining and evolving 
these reflexively determined risks as they are key to the re/de/construction of risk perceptions and 
critical to the pedagogic process Beck (1992a p. 181) stresses as essential for reflexive 
modernity.  
 
Drawing upon this short review of this literature, we suggest that examining accountability 
mechanisms offers a valuable insight into the legitimate risks of any (sub)political institution, and 
their modes of governance. Understanding accountability processes will allow the evaluation of 
the extent to which any system is reflexive. Who accounts to whom, what they account, how the 
account for it, how their accounts are received by others and how they perceive others accounts 
of the same phenomena, are important variables in an empirical study of accountability and risk 
governance. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the nature of accountability links that would be evidence of a reflexive 
process. The absence of any of these links would be detrimental and indicate a potentially 
ineffective risk governance assemblage. Ineffective, or unreflexive, risk governance could 
legitimate the perpetuation of ecological or social harm and create conditions for social conflict 
and disharmony. It should be noted that Figure 3 is over simplistic as it presents political 
institutions, sub-political institutions, corporations, the media and the general public as coherent, 
homogeneous groups. Similar nested communication links within the nodes of the political 




















The risk society inspired literature would predict a number of observable empirical occurrences. 
These would include variations in the perceptions of risks within and between political, sub-
political and business organizations, the denial of certain risk perspectives, fragmented, single 
issue approaches to risk governance in both the political and sub-political domains, the absence 
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of accountability processes or partial fragmented accounts of specific activities and the dominant 
assemblage to be a coalition of sub-political, political institutions legitimating the economic-
technological development of business.  It may also be possible to observe limited consensus and 
the emergence of proto -reflexivity of certain less controversial risks. 
 
In the next section we will present some of our findings from our arena based investigation into 
salmon farming, an industry in crisis. These findings will include the risk perceptions of different 
groups, risk legitimisation debates, key sub -political and political actors and their assemblage and 




Given the quantity and complexity of the evidence gathered in this study, this paper will not be 
able to discuss all of our data. The perspective adopted in this paper is a systemic overview, 
rather than detailed micro-analysis. This micro level will hopefully be the subject of subsequent 
papers on this topic. The high level of resolution adopted in this paper necessarily simplifies 
some of the detailed empirics collected. However, in a few instances we will present some of 
these micro-details to illustrate some of the issues arising from our systemic cut of the data. 
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Figure 4 represents the participants of the study classified by their arena-roles. Figure 4 also 
indicates the type of information gathered. The symbols on the diagram represent the main mode 
of gathering empirical data. Table 1 provides defines each of the symbols. Note that some of the 
participants played multiple roles in the arena and in some cases multiple methods were used 
with some participants. 
 
Table 1 – Key to Symbols used in Figure 4 
 
* Interview 
$ Documentary Analysis 
# Postal Survey 
+ External Site Visits 
 
Brief details of each of the actors involved in this study listed in appendix 1. 
 
As mentioned earlier Figure 4 represents the main actors and their respective roles in our 
modified8 arena model of salmon farming. All of the stakeholders can be classified as sub-
political movements and vary in terms of their stance on the desirability of the salmon farming. 
From figure 4 a number of issues are worthy of note. Firstly, the large number of different 
political institutions involved in governing salmon farming. Responsibility for specific aspects of 
salmon farming is spread over a range of different political and sub-political institutions. There 
does not seem to be a single institution or mechanism that integrates or views salmon farming 
holistically.  Secondly, the large number of different rule enforcers and in particular the number 
of sub-political groups operating in what is traditionally a function of political institutions. The 
Soil Association, SSGA, SQS, RQS and supermarkets are sub -political, but they are accepted as 
legitimate enforcers and standard setters for the industry.  
 
However, these sub-political groups are involved with voluntary rule enforcement, i.e. regimes 
which the salmon farmers choose to submit to. The main stated justification for submitting to 
these controls is the marketing and price advantages associated with compliance and consequent 
product certification. These regimes are much more stringent and prescriptive than political 
regimes, but they do confer a visible differentiation of their fish and attracts a premium price tag. 
The possible exceptions in this assumption of voluntariness in sub -political rules are the 
supermarkets. Compliance with supermarket quality requirements is essential for supermarkets 
purchasing farmers’ salmon. Supermarkets tend to forward purchase whole harvests for an agreed 
price, however contracts contain clauses that allow supermarkets to withdraw from the purchase 
based on any deviation from prescribed practises. Given that supermarkets control over 85% of 
salmon sold in the UK (SSGA interview) and the subsequent collapse of the wholesale market for 
salmon, it is difficult to regard the supermarkets as voluntary sub-political rule enforcers. 
 
As suggested by Beck and others (see for example Foucault 1984, 1988, 1991, Ewald 1991, 
Gordon 1991, Kendall and Wickham 1992, Castel 1991, Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994a, b, 2002) the 
risk governance systems is fragmented, with different institutions involved but with extremely 
restrictive remits, either by legislation or by sub-political ideologies. Each institution has its own 
                                                
8 The main modification is the separation of stakeholding groups into ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ camps and the distinction 
between political and sub-political rule enforcers. 
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specific agenda as to hazard prioritisation and engagement strategies. What is interesting is to 
note the approach of the sub -political groups to effect change and gain political legitimisation for 
their risk perceptions. Sub-political groups are engaging via scientific arguments, either by 
producing and promoting their independent scientific studies to add to or challenge the current 
notion of best scientific knowledge on the topic, or by scientifically critiquing the basis of the 
‘legitimate’ risk position or the effectiveness of political governance methods. For example, 
WWF describe themselves as a challenging, constructive, science-based organisation 
(www.wwf.org.uk, 18/5/2004). Even the most radical sub -political group, SFPG make extensive 
use of scientific evidence and scientific critique amplified via mass media channels. Generally 
the sub-political approach is to improve the scientific evidence upon which regulations and 
political governance structures are based. Our observations on the sub-political movements 
involved in salmon farming, fit the description of the beginning of a reflexive process by Beck 
and others (Beck 1992a, b, 1994a, b, 1995, 1996, Beck et al, 1994, Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994a, 
b, 2002, Lash 1993, 1994a, b, 2000, Lash & Wynne 1992, Wynne 1989, 1992, 1996). Reflexivity 
does also require the political institutions to engage constructively with these sub-political 
movements, and as will be seen later, our observations suggest a lack of willingness of political 
institutions to accept this new scientific evidence. 
 





















































































Figure 5 provides a map of the main risk themes9 that emerged from our investigations. This map 
is an attempt to provide a holistic presentation of the multiple dimensions of risk in salmon 
farming. The range of different dimensions of risk is perhaps larger than would be assumed from 
a common-sense perspective. It should be recognized that this is a composite representation of all 
the different risks from all of the actors identified in Figure 4. No single institution10 described all 
of these risks and even when they were aware of risk claims, they actually denied the existence of 
certain risks. The shaded boxes represent the most contested risk claims. Those contested risks 
are largely contests between sub-political ‘anti’ groups and a coalition between political 
                                                
9 A more detailed breakdown of the risk sub-themes is available from the authors on request.  
10 We can provide details of each actors individual risk perceptions on request, unfortunately space restrictions make 
this impractical. 
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institutions, sub-political ‘pro’ groups and the farmers. This coalition presented a consistent 
position of the irrationality and misguidedness of these campaign groups risk claims. For 
example, this is a quote from SSGA interview; 
 
“The industry has had a terrible press from a few people who are anti-fish farming 
campaigners. These are absolute nut cases” (SSGA). 
 
“The divergence of views makes constructive dialogue impossible because they throw 
rocks at each other” (SEPA). 
 
Examples of risk denial include; 
 
“The wild stocks (of salmon) have been declining for the last 50 years, long before 
the industry” (SSGA) 
 
“The industry asserts that its environmental footprint is minimal while the 
environmentalists say no-one knows until more hard data is available” (SEERAD). 
 
“The government until recently was refusing to accept that linkage between the 
industry and sealice” (RSTA). 
 
There was an absent of significant dispute over legitimate risks between the farmers and the 
political institutions charged with governing their risks. The farmers view compliance with the 
regulatory regime as eliminating all significant environmental and social risks (Georgakopoulos 
and Thomson 2005). The political institutions generally express confidence in their methods of 
governing all the significant risks of salmon farming. What was noticeable from the interviews 
and documentary analysis is the co-operation and co-reliance of the fish farmers and those tasked 
with their governance. Two examples of this are; 
 
“SEPA acts as an intermediary between the salmon farming industry and the local 
sea trout association” (SEPA). 
 
“There is a potential risk for public health coming from the pigmentation of the 
salmon flesh. However, SSGA estimated that the amount of salmon one needs to eat in 
order to develop a problem is not humanly possible to eat” (SEERAD Fisheries 
Research Group) 
 
In the first quote it can be seen that SEPA has adopted a mediatory role between the industry and 
one of the protest groups seeking reform in salmon farming practices. In relation to the second 
quote, it is worth remembering that the SSGA is a sub-political lobby group whose main 
objective is to promote and develop salmon farming. Yet the most powerful political regulatory 
institution is using their ‘facts’ to discount the claims of other sub -political groups. Conversely, 
anti-sub-political stakeholders described their relationship with the political institutions and rule 
enforcers as difficult with lots of friction and described a lack of willingness to listen to their 
concerns, particularly in relation to the effectiveness of the regulatory regimes. 
 
Submitted to Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference July 2006 
17 
“The industry claims it is clean because it follows SEPA’s regulations, but sea lice is 
not regulated by anyone and SEPA’s models used for the monitoring of the 
discharges are too simplistic based on fjord type systems, unable to grasp the 
complexity of the issues at least in our region...so there is a lot of prescriptive 
inflexible regulation which does not relate a lot to what is happening” (RSTA). 
 
“The consequences of the whole genetic mixing between farmed and wild salmon are 
unknown. At the bottom line, we do not know what is actually happening. There is not 
good monitoring of the escapees, we do not know where they go or the impacts they 
have” (WWF). 
 
“Lack of knowledge and information about the cumulative impacts of the fish farms. 
There is a lot of ignorance out there and there is not the necessary information that 
will convince a public inquiry that some developments are dangerous”’ (RSPB). 
 
Concerns were expressed about the lack of accountability of political institutions over their 
operations and ways in which individuals would use sub-political institutions to drive change. 
One story recounted in an interview was of scientists working in the Fishery Research Services 
who were forbidden by SEERAD from publishing negative findings leaking facts to pressure 
groups. Other examples included politicians tipping off sub-political organizations about issues 
they felt they could not publicly talk about themselves, in order that these issues could be part of 
the public discourse about salmon farming.  Certain sub-political groups admitted to the 
usefulness of extreme activists in dealing with issues which they felt their ‘formal’ interests did 
not apply. 
 
Our representation of the communication in the governance assemblage (see Figure 6) does not 
satisfy the requirement of the reflexive model represented in Figure 3. The configuration of 
communication routes appears to substantiate Beck’s description of industrial modernity, where 
political institutions effectively operating as structures to legitimate business practice. The Soil 
Association is perhaps slightly unusual in that it can be seen to be part of this legitimisation 
structure by creating the possibility of salmon farming being organic. In fact they were criticised 
by other sub-political groups for this stance and their motives questioned, the most common 
comment was that the SA were more concerned with empire building than promoting 
sustainability and that organic production is not necessarily sustainable.  
 
“The so-called organic fish will affect in some way the pristine environment and it will have 
some kind of interaction with the wild fish. In that way organic salmon farming would be 




Figure 6 – Observed Salmon Arena Configuration. 
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The accounting demands by the political and sub-political risk governance process on the salmon 
farmers are extensive and farmers are producing a considerable volume of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures to a wide range of different external bodies in a variety of different modes. 
However, each of these accounts tend to be very specific and delivered to a range of different 
accountees based on their powers, rules, ideological position and contextual definition of what 
counts as legitimate information. However, the same comment could not be made about the 
accountability of these political institutions and sub-political groups.  
 
Mapping the significant communication links observed in this study identified an absence of a 
number of key links. In terms of the nested communications in the political and sub -political 
nodes, there appeared to be a major deficit in the intra-political communications. The sub-
political ‘anti’ group did appear to have a far greater degree of intra-sub-political 
communications. The sub-political anti groups did also appear to be more transparent and provide 
fuller accounts of their activities available for access by the general public. Whilst a number of 
sub-political groups accepted that there now was better communication with the industry (RFA, 
RSPB, RSTA, WWF, FOE) they also strongly supported the need for better communication and 
more accountability. 
 
The lack of intra-political institutional communication can be represented by a sample of typical 
quotes from interviews; 
 
“a lack of co-ordination between the RA and SEPA” (SEPA, REN) 
“Risk for a clash between a local and a national policy on 
development/sustainability grounds. Co-ordination is needed with SEERAD” 
(RA, SEPA, REN) 
 “‘Risks from the lack of clear planning remit between the Crown Estate and 
the local authorities” (SEPA, REN) 
“Regulatory risk for the sustainability of the fishmeal fisheries from the 
inability of the latter to meet the strict standards of international accreditation 
bodies” (SEPA). 
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“Health risk for the public might exist from the presence of things in the 
fishfeed. However, the official position is that the public should eat fish 
because it is healthy” (RA, REN). 
 “The elected members of the council will make their decisions based on 
economy and employment, not on conservation issues” (RSPB) 
 
Our observation of the accountability of this particular arena is that it is an unreflexive risk 
governance assemblage. However, in relation to certain risks where there is a degree of 
consensus there is evidence of a proto-reflexive relationship between a number of the sub-
political and political institutions, as evidenced by the emergence of less antagonistic engagement 
processes. For example the ministerial and tri-partite working groups when preparing the 
Strategic Framework for Scottish Aquaculture. The potential for an on-going dialogue is present 
and some of the antagonism between certain actors has begun to diminish as groups 
constructively engage and undertake mutually agreed actions. For example voluntary agreements 
on the use of anti-predatory nets, allowing sub-political groups to visit fish farms and co-
operation in the preparation of EIAs. However, this process is new and relatively fragile and it is 
not possible to predict its future development with any degree of confidence, but it is the 
beginning of a reflexive process with representatives from all three sides reporting successful 
changes in the praxis of others, which past observers would have regarded as near impossible. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS.     
In this paper, we have mapped at an arena level the governance structures (both political and sub-
political), the accountability mechanisms, the legitimate risks of the different actors in this 
salmon farming arena. Our system level analysis of the empirical data is consistent with the 
model derived from the emergent Risk Society literature. Within this model accountability is 
integral to an interdependent, co-evolving set of relationships between risk perceptions, risk 
legitimisation mechanisms, governance structures and institutions. Accountability processes are 
viewed as key elements of the reflexivity necessary to more effectively govern the risks, hazards 
and actual linked with industrial modernity. The lack of effective reflexivity is seen to be 
connected with a legitimisation and proliferation of the hazards of industrial modernity rather 
than managing and mitigating its harm.  
 
Our analysis of the salmon farming arena provides empirical evidence to support a lack of 
reflexivity, fragmented ‘single-issue’ political and non-political governance structures, polarised 
‘legitimate’ risks positions, lack of accountability between governance institutions and contested 
discourse between the different participants in this arena study.  Our evaluation is that the political 
governance structures legitimise fish- farming practices and dismiss the sub -political groups as 
irrational, nutcases throwing rocks at fish farmers and regulators. Political institutions are 
adopting an ‘objective’  techno-scientific rational to justify their position and to reject the 
criticisms of the others. However, somewhat paradoxically they rely on scientific data provided 
to them by sub-political supporters of salmon- farming. Within the salmon farming arena the 
political institutions, fish farmers and certain sub-political groups are acting in coalition to protect 
the industry, rather than to protect the eco-systems and wider society from potential harm. The 
‘anti’ sub-political movement are adopting a techno-scientific discourse to engage with the 
political institutions to legitimate their risk positions and therefore change the mode of risk 
governance.  
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The evidence gathered supports the contested nature of risks and the view that risk perceptions 
are locally, temporally and epistemologically defined. Considerable diversity in risk perceptions 
were revealed to be at the core of the discourses between the different parties. Evidence was also 
available to support the de-politicising of the political institution on two key dimensions. Firstly, 
the reliance on techno-scientific evidence and thinking to underpin risk governance institutions 
and processes and secondly, the number and nature of sub-political groups involved in rule-
enforcing. Rule enforcement, normally assumed to be the function of political institutions, was 
partially enacted by ‘pro’ sub-political groups. The exception to this assemblage was the Soil 
Association, which entered into the rule-enforcing role in order to legitimise and promote the 
notion of organic aquaculture. In many cases the most stringent conditions on farmers activities 
came from these sub-political rule-enforcers. 
 
 The main accountability mechanisms used by the salmon farmers were to satisfy the rule-
enforcers of their compliance with their specific rules. There was an absence of what we 
normally would term social and environmental accounting/reporting in this arena, we would 
argue because of the scientific nature of the engagement activities, rather than an economic 
discourse.  
 
There is not an absence of social and environmental accountability in this salmon farming arena. 
The salmon farmers provide a rich, diverse and comprehensive set of social, environmental and 
economic accounts to a range of political and sub-political institutions, dependent upon the 
perceived powers of these institutions. The salmon farmers provide far more information to these 
stakeholders than these organisations provide to others. The chain of accountability processes is 
incomplete, opaque and fragmented or in other words unreflexive. We do not argue that all 
relevant risks are accounted for or that they are adequately measured and governed, however, the 
existing accounts have considerable potential for an emergent, holistic accounting of the social 
and environmental costs (and benefits) of salmon farming. This existing information, if made 
available, could be integrated into a useful re-presentation of the salmon sector that could be used 
as part of the dialogic engagement that is critical to the reflexive process. We do not claim that 
these emergent accounts would be a ‘true and fair’ view, but rather could act as a heuristic 
learning device creating the space for a more meaningful mutual critique of the different 
positions held within the arena. 
 
Salmon farmers are providing numerous accounts of their actions, yet these institutions are 
largely unaccountable. Each institution (political and sub-political) has its own definition of its 
‘legitimate’ risks. Their ‘legitimate’ risk perception is intrinsically linked with their specific 
accountability demands on the salmon farmers. These fragmented accounts reinforce their 
legitimated risk perceptions, rather than reflexively critique them. The absence of a holistic, 
sustainable, stakeholder (who is possibly a mythical creature) and the relationship between the 
difference institutions means that the salmon farming accountability processes are extremely 
problematic.  
 
Crudely, the different institutions can be characterised as ‘single-issue’ demanding partial and 
specific ‘accounts’ of the salmon farmers practices whilst prescribing specific ‘solutions’ to 
minimise or eliminate specific ‘risks’. No meta-governance process (reflexivity) exists that could 
integrate or synthesise these specific ‘accounts’, ‘solutions’ or ‘risks’. 
 
Submitted to Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference July 2006 
21 
We would argue that this study raises a number of important issues for the development of 
thinking on social and environmental accounting11. The absence of formal social and 
environmental accounts does not necessarily imply an absence of social and environmental 
accountability. The demands for social and environmental accounts of organisations is likely to 
be reflexively linked to political and sub-political discourses on risks, the diversity of risk 
legitimisation practices in the relevant arena, the relative powers of the political and sub -political 
groups, the alignment and/or coalition of these different groups, the existing ‘accounts’ in the 
public domain and the rule-enforcing bodies.  Mapping the accountability routes and content can 
provide a valuable insight into the risk governance processes, the legitimate risk perceptions of 
different parties and powers of different rule enforcers. 
 
In examining social and environmental accounting an awareness of both the political and sub-
political dynamic is important, particularly given that change is normally driven by the sub-
political dynamic. Political institutions tend to be non-politicised, working to defend the status 
quo, hampered by their epistemological dependence on scientism. If social and environmental 
accounting is to form part of a change process it must both be sensitive to the sub -political 
movement, as the driver of change, yet also be expressed in a way that would be regarded as 
legitimate by the relevant political institutions. This is not an impossible task as can be observed 
from the growing success of sub-political movements using this strategy. On a more mundane 
level, recognising the existence of this accountability to rule enforcers would be an extremely 
fruitful resource for the emerging shadow accounting project, particularly given the introduction 
of the Freedom of Information Act in the UK. 
 
The sub-political dynamic problematises the appropriate entity of social and environmental 
accounting. The majority of the efforts of sub-political groups is not aimed at individual 
companies, but rather targeted at the rule-enforcers. Concentrating engagement activities to 
reform rules allows these efforts to have an industry-wide impact. Rule enforcers, especially the 
political institutions, are potentially easier to change than individual companies who use 
compliance with rules as evidence of acceptable behaviour. Political institutions are, in theory 
anyway, subject to democratic accountability, control and reform. Our study suggests that there is 
some merit in creating an additional ‘accounting entity’ demanding social and environmental 
accountability of the rule-enforcers as to the effectiveness of their operations. Accountability of 
industry level governance structures would appear to be a critical part of the social and 
environmental accounting project. 
 
What was perhaps an important insight from this study was the absence of the ‘sustainability’ 
stakeholder. Despite the media scrutiny, scientific studies, sub -political campaigns and extensive 
political regulatory regimes, there was no holistic overview. Each party involved in the arena 
limited themselves to a narrow definition of sustainability, wild sea trout, birds, visual impact, 
chemical additives, linked to their specific interests and demanding accounts in relation to these 
interests. Little evidence of a concern for a full, interdisciplinary accounts and the lack of 
reflexivity meant that the holistic account was not ‘demanded’. We would tentatively suggest that 
Social and Environmental Accounting, rather than producing accounts for that mythical 
                                                
11 More information on issues of sustainability, and its links with accounting and accountability in can be found in 
Duncan (1997), Bebbington (1999), Bebbington et al (2001, 2004), Bebbington and Thomson (2005, 2004, 1996), 
Gray (1990, 1997), Gray and Bebbington (2001), Gray et al (1993, 1996), Cooper (1992), Cooper and Thomson 
(2000). 
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stakeholder actually, becomes that mythical stakeholder, constructing them in the production of 
these accounts that form such a critical part of the dialogical process of establishing an effective 
reflexive system, particularly in the risk legitimisation debates. 
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Appendix 1 – List and brief description of participants  
 
Salmon Farmers  
· OS1, OS2 are small family run organic fishfarms.  
· OS3 is a small organic business that produce salmon, fry and smolts. 
· ML1, ML2 are both parts of multinational fishfarming groups producing conventional and 
organic salmon.  
· TL1 is a large salmon farming business producing non-organic salmon and smolts. 
· TL2 is a large salmon farming business, that is a subsid iary of a larger national company 
producing non-organic salmon, fry and smolts. 
· TS1, SS1 are small firms that are subsidiaries of larger national companies, producing 
non-organic fry and smolt. 
· TS2, TS3, TS4, TS5 are small family run businesses producing non-organic salmon. TS5 
also produce mussels. 
· TM1 is part of a larger family run group of companies producing non-organic salmon.  
· TM2, TM4 are medium sized companies producing non-organic salmon. 
· SS1 is a small company that is a subsidiary of a larger firm and produces non-organic 
smolts. 
· MK is the marketing company of TM1. 
· MM is a large salmon producing company producing conventional and organic salmon.  
· Sm a large smolt producing company. 
· SP is a small independent firm producing non-organic smolts and is also involved in 
salmon processing. 
· SMK is a small salmon smoking company.  
 
RULE ENFORCERS 
· SEPA - Scottish Environment Protection Agency. SEPA is the regulatory and 
enforcement authority for environmental protection and pollution control in Scotland, 
covering discharges to air, land and water.  
· Regional Authority - The Regional Authority (RA) is a democratically elected single, all-
purpose local authority.  It makes political decisions on policy statements and strategies, 
including local strategic plan and delivering services and enforcing statutes and 
regulations.  
· Soil Association (SA) - an independent charity and its mission is to create an informed 
body of public opinion about the link between farming practice and plant, animal, human 
and environmental health and to promote organic agriculture and is the UK main organic 
certification mark  
· SSGA - Scottish Salmon Growers Association is the official representative body of the 
salmon farming industry. SSGA plans the production of the industry on a collective basis, 
provides funding for various projects, plays a public relations role for the industry.        
· SQS - Scottish Quality Salmon operates a quality product labeling scheme.  
· RQS – Regional Quality Salmon operating locally based labeling schemes.  
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· HSE – Health and Safety Executive are responsible for the regulation of health and safety 
issues.  
· MCA - Maritime and Coastguard Agency aims to develop, promote and enforce high 
standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention, to minimise loss of life amongst 
seafarers and coastal users, and to minimise pollution from ships to sea and the coastline.  
· FSA - Food Standard Agency is an independent food safety watchdog set up by an Act of 
Parliament to protect the public’s health and consumer interests in relation to food.   
· CE The Crown Estate: is a political agency responsible for the management of the 
territorial seabed and most of the foreshore between high and low water mark.  
· VMD - Veterinary Medicines Directorate is an Executive Agency of the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs protecting public health, animal health and the 
environment, and promoting animal welfare by assuring the safety quality and efficacy of 
Veterinary medicines. 
· EMEA - European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products co-ordinates the 
existing scientific resources for the Member States in order to evaluate and supervise 
medicinal products for both human and veterinary use throughout the whole of the EU.  
 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
· SEERAD - Scottish Executive Environment & Rural Affairs Department is responsible 
for advising Ministers on policy relating to agriculture, rural development, food, the 
environment and fisheries, and for ensuring the implementation of those policies.  
· REN - Regional Enterprise Network is responsible for economic and community 
development across a diverse geographical area which covers more than half of Scotland. 
The network reports to the Enterprise & Lifelong Learning Department of the Scottish 
Executive and its services are delivered through local enterprise companies.  
· SNH - Scottish Natural Heritage is the Scottish Executive’s statutory adviser on natural 
heritage (wildlife, habitats, and landscapes) and nature conservation matters, including 
promotion of nature’s sustainable use, and for fostering its understanding and enjoyment 
by the public.  
 
STAKEHOLDERS – OPPOSING SALMON FARMING 
· RSPB - The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. RSPB is a wildlife conservation 
charity with more than a million members. It promotes an extensive range of political 
campaigns on a range of issues that affect wildlife and habitats.  
· WWF - World Wide Fund Scotland: WWF is an environmental non governmental 
network operating in more than 90 countries. They see themselves as a challenging, 
constructive, science-based organisation that addresses issues from the survival of species 
and habitats to climate change, sustainable business and environmental education 
(www.wwf.org.uk, 18/5/2004).   
· FOE - Friends of the Earth Scotland FOE is a non-governmental network of 
environmental groups with representation in 68 countries and one of the leading 
environmental pressure groups in the UK.   
· SFPG – Salmon Farm Protest Group The Salmon Farm Protest Group (SFPG) exists to 
protect the  marine and freshwater environment from fish farm disease and pollution. The 
SFPG does not oppose fish farming, but rather wish to ensure that it is undertaken in a 
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way that preserves the wild species, unpolluted coastal and inland waters, and people who 
rely upon that environment for their livelihoods.  
· RFA – Regional Fisheries Association represents politically the local sea fishermen’s 
interests.  
· RSTA – Regional Sea Trout Association RSTA is a NGO committed to maintain public 
access for anglers and promoting a healthy environment. They offer mooring areas in 
some lochs for members with boats and they also have a small scale restocking 
programme for brown trout and other local fish stocks.  
 
STAKEHOLDERS – FOR SALMON FARMING 
· SSGA and RSGA See ruler enforcers. 
· Supermarkets dominate the retailing of salmon and organic salmon in particular and play 
a critical role in legitimating the production of farmed salmon and in driving product 
modifications. Supermarkets were seen to impose considerable quality requirements on 
the producers and prescribe what they regard as acceptable production regimes.  
· Fishmongers perspective is very similar to that of the supermarkets and are supportive of 
Scottish salmon. 
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